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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORYREMARKS
CAROLINE GENTILE: Good evening. I am Caroline Gentile, and
I am one of the founding directors of the Fordham Corporate Law Center.
Together with Dean Diller and my colleague Sean Griffith, the current
Director of the Corporate Law Center,1 I am delighted to welcome you to
the Seventeenth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate,
Securities, and Financial Law. This lecture, like the preceding sixteen
lectures, would not be possible without the generosity of the DeStefano
family and Becker, Ross, Stone, DeStefano, & Klein, LLP.2
In many ways, Mr. DeStefano represents the best that Fordham Law
School offers to its students, to the practicing bar, and to the community.
He began his studies as a part-time student working during the day. By
the time he finished his time here, he was a member of the Fordham Law
Review3 and the top student in his class. While practicing corporate law
with a specialty in mergers and acquisitions, he returned to the Law
School as a tremendously popular adjunct professor, sharing his
knowledge and expertise with hundreds of students.4 Throughout his
entire life he remained active in innumerable charitable endeavors.5
We are honored to have with us here tonight his son, Paul DeStefano,
a graduate of Fordham University, and his granddaughter, Katherine
DeStefano, a recent graduate of our law school.
Like the proceeding lectures, tonight’s lecture will be published in
the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, which is the single
most-cited specialty journal in banking and finance and among the top ten
specialty journals in corporations and business associations.6
1. Sean J. Griffith, FORDHAMU.SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23142/sean
_j_griffith [https://perma.cc/K3J4-ZUJX] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
2. Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law,
FORDHAMU. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23050/public_lectures/6100/albert
_a_destefano_lecture_on_corporate_securities_and_financial_law [https://perma.cc/MH
9M-YF4B] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
3. Masthead to 16 FORDHAM L. REV. (1947); Masthead to 15 FORDHAM L. REV.
(1946).
4. Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law, supra
note 2.
5. Id.
6. According to the ranking system maintained by the Law Library at Washington
& Lee University School of Law. See Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2009–
2016, WASH. &LEEU. SCH. L., http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/V2
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We are grateful for the work of all of our editors, particularly Shrisha
Juneja, this year’s Editor-in-Chief, and Giselle Sedano, this year’s
Symposium Editor.7
We also owe a great debt of gratitude to Vera Korzun, a member of
our adjunct faculty and the Administrative Director of the Corporate Law
Center,8 for marshaling all of the information and materials for this
lecture. For all the preparations this evening, we are indebted to both
Julian Phillippi, our Conference Manager, and to Shanelle Holley, our
Conference Administrator.
As a result of all these commitments from so many people over so
many years, we are tremendously fortunate to have the Honorable Karen
L. Valihura with us this evening.
When announcing her nomination to the Delaware Supreme Court,
Governor Markell described Justice Valihura as “an attorney of
uncommon skill, intelligence, and integrity, who has earned a well-
deserved reputation for excellence in her twenty-five years of private
practice.”9During her investiture ceremony, Governor Markell stated that
“she represents the best of the legal community in Delaware.”10
Prior to her appointment to the Delaware Supreme Court, Justice
Valihura was a partner in the Wilmington office of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom.11 Her practice encompassed a wide range of high-
profile litigation involving complex commercial and corporate issues,
including mergers and acquisitions, fiduciary duties of directors, and
PS-GFTG] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (to replicate the search results, search “Subject:
Banking and Finance;” then “Edit type: Student-edited;” and “Ranking Criteria: Case
cites”).
7. Masthead to 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (2016–17).
8. Vera Korzun, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23646/i_-
_k/7191/vera_korzun [https://perma.cc/N3J7-B94A] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
9. KarleeWeinmann, Skadden Atty to Boost Litigation Prowess of Del. High Court,
LAW360 (June 9, 2014, 4:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/545907/skadden-
atty-to-boost-litigation-prowess-of-del-high-court [https://perma.cc/Y4DH-FP84].
10. Sean O’Sullivan, Valihura Becomes Second Woman on Del. Supreme Court,
DEL. ONLINE, http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2014/07/25/valihura-be
comes-second-woman-del-supreme-court/13168087/ [https://perma.cc/5KBY-429V]
(last updated July 26, 2014, 12:10 AM).
11. Biography: Karen L. Valihura, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,MEAGHER&FLOMLLP,
http://sites.udel.edu/wccg/files/2011/10/Valihura_Karen_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EUY-
8PZN] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
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federal and state securities fraud claims as well as e-commerce issues and
unfair business practices.12
For example, she represented the NASDAQ stock market in
connection with its acquisition of Instinet Group, Inc., including the
related appraisal proceeding, and she was the lead counsel representing
Cantor Fitzgerald in one of the longest trials in the Delaware Court of
Chancery.13
Among other business organizations, Justice Valihura served on the
Corporation Law Council of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware
bar and on the advisory board of the John L. Weinberg Center for
Corporate Governance.14
In addition to establishing the Valihura Scholarship Fund at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, from which she received her
Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1988,15 Justice Valihura’s charitable
endeavors include serving as a member of the board of directors for the
Delaware Special Olympics. She received her undergraduate degree from
Washington & Jefferson College in 1985, and last year she received the
Alumni Award for Achievement, which is one of the college’s highest
honors.16
Clearly no one is better suited to discuss “The Role of Appellate
Decision-Making in the Development of Delaware Corporate Law—A
View from Both Sides of the Bench.”
Justice Valihura, we are truly honored to have you present these
remarks as the Seventeenth Annual DeStefano Lecture.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Judicial Officers, DEL. CTS.: SUP. CT., https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/
justices.aspx [https://perma.cc/C95R-EW7A] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
15. Biography: Karen L. Valihura, supra note 11.
16. 2016 Alumni AwardWinners, WASH. & JEFFERSONC., http://www.jayconnected.
com/s/924/alumni/index.aspx?sid=924&gid=1&pgid=2208 [https://perma.cc/2B3H-U6
BF] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
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LECTURE
JUSTICE VALIHURA: Good evening, everyone. Thank you very
much for the kind introduction and invitation to deliver the Seventeenth
Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture this evening. It is an honor for me
to be here.
I am in my third year of a twelve-year term as a Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court. As Professor Gentile said, immediately prior
to my investiture in July 2014,17 I had spent twenty-five years as a
corporate litigator with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP18—
the first eight years as a litigation associate, and then seventeen years as
a litigation partner. I am grateful for those terrific and exciting years I had
in private practice. The experience I gained as a litigator working with
clients to help solve problems has served as an enormously useful
foundation for my present position as a Justice.
During my career as a lawyer, in addition to client work, I served in
a number of other capacities that provided me with valuable experience
and insight into the nuts and bolts of the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL). For example, I served on the Corporation Law Council of
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association for eight
years.19 The Council is the body that assists with the continuous review
of the DGCL and the drafting of amendments to that body of law.20
Changes to the DGCL are subject to great study and a careful deliberative
process by a group of experienced corporate practitioners in the Bar.21
This careful process contributes to stability in our State’s corporation
laws. Also, in aid of promoting stability, Article IX of Delaware’s
Constitution requires a supermajority vote to amend the DGCL. Section
1 of Article IX, for example, provides that “[n]o general incorporation
law, nor any special act of incorporation, shall be enacted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House of the
General Assembly.”22 As a practitioner who was deep in the corporate
litigation trenches, I understood that stability and predictability in our
17. O’Sullivan, supra note 10.
18. Biography: Karen L. Valihura, supra note 11.
19. Judicial Officers, supra note 14.
20. About the Section of Corporation Law, DEL. ST. B.ASS’N, https://www.dsba.org/
sections-committees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/ [https://perma.cc/R5FW-XW
KS] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
21. Id.
22. DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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corporation law are important reasons why corporations look to Delaware
as a situs for incorporation.
One of the things clients seek from their litigation counsel in any
litigated controversy is an informed view of the current state of the law
impacting the issues that might be the subject of litigation, and how a
Delaware court might analyze such issues. I am ethically constrained from
discussing any pending cases or matters that are likely to come before the
Court. But what I can speak about generally tonight is how the Delaware
Supreme Court operates and what types of things impact the Court’s
appellate decision-making process.
At the appellate level, unlike the trial court level, parties typically are
not told in advance who the members of the panel will be once an appeal
has been filed. If the matter is heard en banc, all five members of the
Delaware Supreme Court would sit—unless one or more have recused.23
In the event of a recusal, a visiting judge, a member of our trial courts
generally, would be appointed to sit by designation.24 Or the case could
be heard by a panel of three Justices.25
If a client has a matter pending before the Delaware Supreme Court,
that client naturally would want advice regarding the Court’s prior rulings
in that area. In addition, because the Supreme Court is often concerned
about what the policy implications might be for a ruling one way or the
other, a well-advised client would think broadly about the issues in her
case and what the policy implications might be for various possible
outcomes.
The dynamics of appellate decision-making differ from decision-
making by individual trial judges at the trial court level. For one thing, the
collective aspect of the decision-making process is different. In addition,
an appellate court’s more pronounced focus on the broader policy
implications of decisions distinguishes an appellate court from a trial
court.
What role does the Delaware Supreme Court play in setting the
direction of Delaware corporate law? I pose that question keeping in mind
that our role is to say what the law is, not to craft it, which is the role of
23. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2(a).
24. DEL. SUP. CT. INTERNALOPERATING PROCS. § XX, https://courts.delaware.gov/
rules/pdf/SupremeCourtIOP.pdf [https://perma.cc/27H7-CBYU] (last visited Nov. 5,
2017).
25. Id. § IX(2).
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our General Assembly.26 How does the Delaware Supreme Court’s
deliberative process work? What are the types of events that might cause
the Delaware Supreme Court to change the direction of the Delaware law,
and how does the Court impact the law through its decision-making
process? And finally, what might contribute to a lawyer’s effectiveness in
advising clients on matters that have been appealed to the Court? I will
try to respond to these frequently asked questions. I present my remarks
from my vantage points from both sides of the bench.
First, let me address the first two questions by giving you some
background information about the Delaware Supreme Court and how the
Court’s deliberative process works.
Delaware has had a Supreme Court since its 1776 Constitution.27
From 1897 to 1951, however, the judges who sat on the Supreme Court
also regularly served as trial judges.28 In 1951, amendments to the
Delaware Constitution created a separate Delaware Supreme Court in its
present form.29
The 1951 constitutional change creating the separate Delaware
Supreme Court enabled our judicial branch to function more efficiently
by assigning supervisory power over the judicial branch to the new
appellate Court.30 Unlike most state courts of last resort, Delaware has no
intermediate appellate court. As a result, our Supreme Court is required
by the Delaware Constitution to review every final judgment of our trial
courts where an appeal is taken. Consequently, our appellate case load is
quite heavy, averaging over 700 appeals resolved during each year I have
been on the Bench—and that is relatively consistent with the prior years.31
26. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
27. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 12.
28. Id.
29. DEL. CONST. art. IV.
30. Henry R. Horsey &William Duffy, History of the Supreme Court: The Supreme
Court After 1951: The Separate Supreme Court, DEL. CTS.: SUP. CT., https://courts.dela
ware.gov/supreme/history/history3.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WYS-X4VH] (last visited
Nov. 5, 2017).
31. ADMIN. OFF. CTS. ET AL., JOINT STUDY OF THEDELAWARE COURTS CONDUCTED
BY THE DELAWARE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE DELAWARE CHAPTER OF THE
AMERICANCOLLEGEOFTRIALLAWYERS 5 (May 2016), https://courts.delaware.gov/AOC
/docs/ACTL-DSBA-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TQ8-HUEX] (noting over 700
appeals were filed in 2014).
8 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
The two main trial courts are the Court of Chancery (on the equity side)32
and the Superior Court (on the law side, including both civil and criminal
cases).33 The Delaware Supreme Court also hears direct appeals from civil
cases in Family Court; non-juvenile criminal cases from Family Court
proceed through an intermediate appeal in the Superior Court.34 In 1978,
the Supreme Court was expanded to five Justices.35
The Supreme Court has civil appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals as well as final judgments.36 Interlocutory appeals are
discretionary.37
The Supreme Court hears appeals of criminal convictions when the
fine is in excess of $100 or the term of imprisonment is greater than one
month.38
The Delaware Supreme Court is in charge of regulating the practice
of law, and this includes all matters concerning lawyer discipline.39 In
addition, it has jurisdiction for the purpose of exercising extraordinary
writs, e.g., a writ of certiorari—which is used to correct irregularities in
the proceedings of an inferior court; as well as writs of mandamus.40
The Supreme Court has the power to hear certified questions of
law.41 Delaware Supreme Court Rule 41 provides that other Delaware
courts may certify to the Delaware Supreme Court a question or questions
of law arising in any case prior to the entry of final judgment.42 Other
courts and entities may do so as well, including: the United States
Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States
District Court, a United States Bankruptcy Court, the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Highest Appellate Court
32. William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Court of
Chancery, DEL. CTS.: CT. CHANCERY, https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/history.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K8Z5-9FH6] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
33. Henry duPont Ridgely et al., History: The Superior Court, DEL. CTS.: SUPERIOR
CT., https://courts.delaware.gov/superior/aboutus/history2.aspx#sc [https://perma.cc/5V
37-28R2] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
34. Jurisdiction of the Family Court, DEL. CTS.: FAM. CT., https://courts.delaware.
gov/family/jurisdiction.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4GY-EF6Z] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
35. Horsey & Duffy, supra note 30.
36. DEL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 11(1)(a), 11(4).
37. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42.
38. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(1)(b).
39. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 61–64.
40. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(5)–(7); DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 43.
41. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 41.
42. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 41(a)(i).
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of any other state.43 Certification is accepted in the discretion of the
Delaware Supreme Court anywhere there exists important and urgent
reasons for an immediate determination of the questions certified.44 A
certification will not be accepted if facts material to the issue certified are
in dispute.45
Recently, Article IV, Section 11 of our Delaware Constitution was
amended to expand our Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear and
determine certified questions to now include questions certified from “the
highest appellate court of any foreign country, or any foreign government
agency regulating the public issuance or trading of securities, where it
appears to the Supreme Court that there are important and urgent reasons
for an immediate determination of such questions by it.”46 To date, we
have received no such requests from foreign countries.
So how does the Delaware Supreme Court’s deliberative process
work? The Delaware Supreme Court has published its Internal Operating
Procedures (IOPs), and they are presently available on our Court’s
website.47 The IOPs were first published in 1994, and they are intended
to provide the public, the practicing bar, and other courts as well as our
own staff, with a general understanding of how the Delaware Supreme
Court typically operates.48 Of course, “the operating procedures are
subordinate to the Court’s duty to comply with the Constitution, statutes,
and the Court Rules, and the overarching commitment to doing justice in
the diverse procedural circumstances in which cases arise.”49
As I mentioned earlier, cases are either decided en banc (all five
Justices) or by panels of three Justices.50 Each Justice independently
reviews briefs and appendices prior to oral argument or the decisional
conference (if a case is not argued).51 As a general practice, neither the
Justices nor their clerks discuss the merits of a matter between chambers
prior to an oral argument or the decisional conference for cases submitted
on briefs.52 In cases where oral argument is held, the first time the Justices
43. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 41(a)(ii).
44. Id.
45. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 41(b).
46. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
47. DEL. SUP. CT. INTERNALOPERATING PROCS., supra note 24.
48. Id. § I.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
51. DEL. SUP. CT. INTERNALOPERATING PROCS., supra note 24 § V(2).
52. Id.
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exchange views concerning the merits of a case is at the post-argument
conference held immediately after the argument.53 As a result, each
Justice is equally prepared and uninfluenced by the views of others before
the Court’s deliberative process begins.
The Justices typically endeavor to confer with each other
simultaneously, either orally or in writing, by telephone conference, or in
person—as opposed to having sidebar conversations without the full
panel.54
The composition of a Panel is not disclosed to counsel prior to
argument, and the Panels are typically randomly assigned.55
Not every case is set down for oral argument.56 Cases not argued
would be resolved on the briefs after a deliberative process by the Panel.57
Any Justice, however, can vote for argument and, if that occurs, such a
case would be set down for oral argument.58 The Justices generally will
not have oral argument when: the issue is not novel, and the briefs
adequately cover the arguments; or the outcome is clearly controlled by a
decision of the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme
Court; or the factual state of the record will determine the outcome, and
the sole issue is either sufficiency of the evidence, adequacy of jury
instructions, or discretionary rulings, and the briefs adequately address
the record.59
On the other hand, the Justices typically request oral argument when:
the appeal presents a substantial or novel legal issue; the resolution of an
issue presented by the appeal will be of institutional or precedential value;
the Justices have questions to ask of counsel to clarify legal, factual, or
procedural points; a decision, legislative act, or another event that has
occurred since the filing of the briefs may significantly bear on the case;
or an important public policy issue is implicated.60
53. Id. § XII(1).
54. Id. § V(1).
55. Id. § IX(2).
56. Id. § VIII(2) (noting the factors to be considered when examining the desirability
of oral argument).
57. Id. § XII(2).
58. Id. § VIII(1)(c).
59. Id. § VIII(2)(a).
60. Id. § VIII(2)(b).
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The Justices, at conference, comment and cast tentative votes in
reverse order of seniority.61 The senior Justice on the Panel would assign
the opinion writing task.62
If there is a dissent in a Panel of three, the rules provide for an
automatic en banc hearing in the event of any Panel disagreement.63 In
addition, any two Justices can vote for en banc treatment of a case.64 As a
matter of our practice, many corporate cases are heard en banc. That
practice assists us in attempting to maintain consistency in our
corporation law. Each Justice must decide all matters within ninety days
of submission.65 The holding of the Court en banc or a Panel in an opinion
or order is binding on the entire Court and on subsequent Panels.66 Thus,
no subsequent Panel can overrule a prior holding of the Court without
consideration of the Court en banc.67
What might cause changes in our law? With that overview of our
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in mind, let me now focus on the role of
appellate decision-making on the development of Delaware corporate
law. I want to focus on answering the question about what are the types
of things that might cause shifts in our case law.
Lawyers advising clients whose internal affairs are governed by
Delaware law, who have cases pending in Delaware courts, or who have
matters which may eventually become the subject of litigation in
Delaware, need to be able to advise their clients, whether they be
directors, officers, or Special Committees, for example, regarding their
fiduciary duties in structuring transactions—particularly since many
transactions later become the subject of litigation.
For example, a study published by Cornerstone Research examined
litigation challenging M&A deals valued over $100 million.68 The 2016
survey notes that “[i]n 2015 and the first half of 2016, 84 and 64 percent
61. Id. § XII(1).
62. Id. § XII(3).
63. Id.
64. Id. § X(5).
65. Id. § III(2).
66. Id. § IX(6).
67. Id.
68. RAVI SINHA, CORNERSTONE RES., SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2016),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-
Acquisitions-2016 [https://perma.cc/QPJ5-ABX7].
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of M&A deals valued over $100 million were litigated, respectively.”69 It
observes that “[t]his is the first time since 2009 that the rate has dipped
under 90 percent.”70 The article attributes the decline to rulings in
Delaware “that diminished the acceptability of disclosure-only
settlements.”71 So if you are doing a transaction and the deal value is over
$100 million, there is still a fairly good chance that it might be subject to
litigation.
The same is obviously equally true for counsel representing
stockholders who might challenge a given transaction. While each
transaction is different and typically presents issues that may not neatly
fall within the boundaries of case precedents, experienced Delaware
practitioners rely upon the foundation of Delaware case precedents, which
has been constructed over the past two centuries, to navigate clients
through potential pitfalls and novel legal issues.
As I mentioned earlier, the word “predictability” often arises in
discussions of Delaware corporation law as one of the benefits
corporations consider in selecting Delaware as the forum for
incorporation and litigation. The practitioners most immersed in matters
of Delaware law keep close tabs on recent opinions issuing primarily from
the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court. The rush of
client memoranda, articles, and blogs following much-watched decisions
has become the norm. I know from my experience that corporate clients
expect their counsel to keep pace with developments in the law on a real-
time, up-to-the-minute basis.
The Delaware courts recognize the importance of predictability and
stability in our law. But the law does not always develop in a “straight
line.” I have identified a few types of events that might serve as catalysts
for changes in the law.
First, practitioners of Delaware law need to keep their eyes focused
on developments at the highest federal level. Last September, for
example, I moderated a program in Delaware entitled “Supreme Court
Review 2016: A Discussion of Decisions at the Highest State and Federal
Judicial Levels.”72 I will moderate another such program in Delaware on
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. DEL. ST. B. ASS’N, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2016: A DISCUSSION OFDECISIONS
AT THEHIGHEST STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL LEVELS, http://media.dsba.org/CLEReg/
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September 29, 2017.73 In this program, a distinguished panel of lawyers
and scholars focuses on key decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court.74 The program’s great attendance
suggests that lawyers recognize that changes at the highest federal and
state levels are important in being able to effectively advise clients.
Much attention has been paid to the tragic passing of Justice Antonin
Scalia, the vacancy created by his passing, and the process and
implications involved in filling that vacancy.75 The attention paid to filling
that vacancy on the United States Supreme Court highlights the
importance of our nation’s highest appellate court in American society.
Although obviously not of the same level of impact, our Delaware
Supreme Court, as of four days ago, also now has a vacancy that will need
to be filled due to the retirement of our longstanding colleague, Justice
Holland, who served our great state for thirty years.76
On a few occasions recently, our United States Supreme Court has
been the impetus for change in Delaware law. To illustrate, I will mention
two such examples—one in the non-corporate context and one in the
corporate context.
In the non-corporate context, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Rauf v. State of Delaware on August 2, 2016, declaring that
Delaware’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional77 in view of the
United Sates Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida.78 In Rauf, the
Delaware Supreme Court considered certified questions of law posed by
SupremeCourtReview2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5BS-JSAL] (last visited Nov. 5,
2017). The annual program was first started by Justice Randy Holland and Harvey B.
Rubenstein, Esquire several years ago.
73. DEL. ST. B. ASS’N, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2017: A DISCUSSION OFDECISIONS
AT THEHIGHEST STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL LEVELS, http://media.dsba.org/CLEReg/
SupremeCourtReview2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PAS-WNBD] (last visited Nov. 5,
2017).
74. Id.; DEL. ST. B. ASS’N, supra note 72.
75. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick
Garland Fight, CNN (Nov. 9, 2016, 5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/
merrick-garland-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/LLW3-3DNK].
76. Jessica Masulli Reyes, Del.’s Longest-Serving Supreme Court Justice to Retire,
DEL. ONLINE (Feb. 9, 2017, 6:55 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/crime
/2017/02/09/supreme-court-justice-retire-march/97686050/ [https://perma.cc/593Z-ZY
H8]. Since the presentation of this lecture, Justice Gary Traynor has been sworn in as the
Court’s newest Justice. Judicial Officers, supra note 14.
77. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
78. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
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the Delaware Superior Court following the United States Supreme
Court’s decision finding Florida’s death penalty statute unconstitutional
inHurst.79 TheHurstCourt had held that the Sixth Amendment is violated
where the jury’s sentencing verdict is merely advisory and the sentencing
judge actually makes the critical finding necessary to impose a death
sentence.80 Applying Hurst, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a per
curiam opinion in which a majority of the Justices concluded that
Delaware’s death penalty violated the Sixth Amendment.81
Four Justices each wrote separately to share differing views on the
answers to the certified questions.82 The per curiam opinion recognized
the “diversity of views” and expressed the Court’s “shared belief that the
importance of the subject to our state and fellow citizens . . . makes it
useful for all the Justices to bring our various perspectives to bear on these
difficult questions.”83
The second example of change at the highest level being the impetus
for change in our Delaware law occurred in the corporate context and
involved our decision last year inGenuine Parts Co. v. Cepec.84 In Cepec,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that foreign corporations are not
subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware simply because they have
registered to do business and have a registered agent for service of process
in Delaware pursuant to 8 Del. C. §§ 371 and 376.85 Our holding
overruled, in part, our Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Sternberg v. O’Neil issued in 1988.86 In Sternberg, the Delaware Supreme
Court had held that foreign corporations could be subject to personal
jurisdiction in Delaware notwithstanding the absence of the claim’s
connection to Delaware, on the grounds that foreign corporations have
consented to jurisdiction by registering to do business in Delaware.87
The change in our Delaware law resulted from the United States
Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
79. Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433.
80. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 621–22.
81. Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433.
82. Id. at 431.
83. Id. at 433.
84. 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016) (en banc).
85. Id. at 127.
86. 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988) (en banc).
87. Id. at 1107–08.
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Brown,88 and Daimler AG v. Bauman.89 Goodyear and Daimler clarified
the due process limitations on a state court’s power to exercise general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations (i.e., jurisdiction over a corporation
not incorporated within the forum state to adjudicate claims entirely
unconnected to the corporation’s relationship with the forum state).
For example, in Goodyear, the United States Supreme Court held
that state courts “may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state
or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them
when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”90
In Daimler the United States Supreme Court emphasized the
requirement that the corporation be “essentially at home” in the foreign
state and held that conducting business within a state, even to a “sizable”
degree, does not make a foreign corporation “essentially at home.”91
Citing the United States Supreme Court’s decisions inGoodyear and
Daimler, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Cepec that Delaware’s
registration statutes provide a means for service of process and do not
confer general jurisdiction.92 Our Court warned that “an incentive scheme
where every state can claim general jurisdiction over every business that
does any business within its borders for any claim would reduce the
certainty of law and subject businesses to capricious litigation treatment
as a cost of operating in a national scale or entering any state’s market.”93
We stated further that “[u]nder a sensible goose-and-gander
approach, Delaware should be prudent and proportionate in exercising
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.”94 This was perhaps a more formal
way of saying that we are mindful of staying in our judicial lane. Thus,
the Cepec and Rauf cases are examples of how decisions by the United
States Supreme Court have resulted in changes in our state law.
That the Delaware Supreme Court plays a major role in defining the
reach of our law is further illustrated in the case A&R Logistics Holdings,
Inc. v. FdG Logistics LLC.95 There, the Court of Chancery considered, in
88. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
89. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
90. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
91. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761–62.
92. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 127 (Del. 2016) (en banc).
93. Id. at 127–28.
94. Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
95. 148 A.3d 1171 (Del. 2016) (unpublished table decision).
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the first instance, whether the Delaware Securities Act96 applies to a
securities contract that includes a Delaware choice-of-law clause. The
parties’Merger Agreement provided that “all issues concerning” it would
be governed by Delaware law.97 A&R (the Buyer) argued that this
provision required application of the Delaware Securities Act.98However,
the Chancellor concluded that the A&R’s claim under the Delaware
Securities Act failed to state a claim for relief because it had not
established the requisite factual nexus between the challenged merger and
Delaware to trigger application of the Act.99 The Chancellor observed that
“such an interpretation would lead to the bizarre result of converting a
blue-sky statute that the Legislature intended to regulate intrastate
securities transactions into one that would regulate interstate securities
transactions.”100
In analyzing the nexus to Delaware, the Chancellor summed up the
contacts as follows:
Turning to that analysis, the merger here was negotiated on the buy
side by Mason Wells, a private equity firm, and on the sell side by
FdG Logistics, the majority owner of Old A&R.MasonWells is based
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. FdG Logistics is a subsidiary of FdG
Associates, which is based in NewYork City. The headquarters of Old
A&R at the time was in Morris, Illinois. No negotiations concerning
the merger are alleged to have taken place in Delaware, and none of
the allegedly underlying fraudulent business practices or violations is
alleged to have occurred in Delaware. The sole connection that A&R
can draw to Delaware—that the merger parties were incorporated
here—is insufficient under Singer and its progeny to demonstrate the
required nexus.101
Accordingly, the Chancellor found that there was an insufficient
nexus to sustain a claim under the Delaware Securities Act.102 Our Court
affirmed that result.103
96. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, §§ 73-101 to -704 (West 2017).
97. FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R Logistics Holdings, Inc., 131 A.3d 842, 854 (Del.
Ch. 2016), aff’d, 148 A.3d 1171 (Del. 2016) (unpublished table decision).
98. Id. at 845.
99. Id. at 846.
100. Id. (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 856–57 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 857.
103. A&R Logistics Holdings, Inc. v. FdG Logistics LLC, 148 A.3d 1171, 2016 WL
5845786 (Del. Sept. 30, 2016) (Table).
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The Delaware Supreme Court’s issuance of reasoned, written
opinions, particularly in complex areas of corporation law, as well as
alternative entity law, contributes to the vast body of case law already in
existence and facilitates case law development incrementally with the
consideration and resolution of each issue.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently has addressed significant
corporate issues in various of areas of law, including aiding and abetting
liability, post-closing damages, direct/derivative claims, and cases
involving master limited partnerships, to name just a few.
On November 30, 2015, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Rural
Metro Corporation Stockholders Litigation, which held a financial
advisor liable for aiding and abetting a board’s breaches of fiduciary
duty.104 I will not spend a lot of our time on the Rural Metro case as it has
already been the subject of much commentary. But here are just a few
high-level points about that decision.
First, the facts in this case were rather extreme, and the appellant
chose not to challenge on appeal any of the Court of Chancery’s detailed
fact findings. The Court of Chancery had found that the financial advisor
knowingly induced a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the Board by
exploiting the advisor’s own conflicted interests to the detriment of the
Board and by creating an informational vacuum.105 The claim of aiding
and abetting was, in essence, premised on the advisor’s fraud on its own
client’s Board.106 In affirming a liability award against a financial advisor
on the basis of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, our Supreme
Court stressed that the requirement of establishing scienter on the part of
the alleged aider and abettor is “among the most difficult to prove.”107 But
it held that the stringent standard “was satisfied by the unusual facts
proven at trial and which have not been seriously challenged on
appeal.”108
Second, the Supreme Court commented that the relationship between
a financial advisor and the Board is typically a contractual one. It is not
one in which the financial advisor can be deemed to be a “gate keeper”
104. In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 6350-VCL, 2015 WL 725425,
*1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2015), aff’d sub nom, RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129
A.3d 816, 822 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
105. RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 862 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
106. Id. at 865.
107. Id. at 865–66.
108. Id. at 866.
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responsible for ensuring that members of the Board fulfill their fiduciary
duties. Footnote 191 in the opinion addressed this point specifically.109
Third, the opinion sets forth some important takeaways for Boards
dealing with potential advisor conflicts of interest. While a Board may be
free to consent to certain conflicts, directors need to be active and
“reasonably informed when overseeing the sale process, including
identifying and responding to actual or potential conflicts of interest.”110
However, consent to a conflict does not give the advisor a “free pass” to
act in its own self-interest and to the detriment of its client.111 “Because a
conflicted advisor may, alone, possess information relating to a conflict,
the [B]oard should require disclosure of, on an ongoing basis, material
information that might impact the [B]oard’s process.”112 In sum, although
the Supreme Court’s Rural Metro decision on appeal is significant in
many respects, the opinion itself describes its holding as a “narrow one”
arising from the “unusual facts” of the case.113
Another important decision in the area of post-closing damages was
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC114—a unanimous, en banc
decision that has impacted deal-related litigation. There, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of claims and
its holding that the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of
review in post-closing damages suits involving mergers that are not
subject to the entire fairness standard and that have been approved by a
fully informed, uncoerced majority of disinterested stockholders, even
where the vote is statutorily required.115
In Corwin, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “[f]or sound
policy reasons, Delaware corporate law has long been reluctant to second-
109. Id. at 865 n.191. There, we stated that, “[t]he banker is under an obligation not
to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of the board of directors, thereby
undermining the very advice that it knows the directors will be relying upon in their
decision making processes.” Id. We stated further that, “[a]dhering to the trial court’s
amorphous “gatekeeper” language would inappropriately expand our narrow holding
here by suggesting that any failure by a financial advisor to prevent directors from
breaching their duty of care gives rise to an aiding and abetting claim against the advisor.”
Id.
110. See id. at 855 (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1283–84 (Del. 1989)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 856.
113. Id. at 865.
114. 125 A.3d 304, 305 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
115. Id. at 306.
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guess the judgment of a disinterested stockholder majority that
determines that a transaction with a party other than a controlling
stockholder is in their best interest.”116 In rejecting the claim that
application of the business judgment rule would undermine Revlon117 and
Unocal,118 the Court stated that Unocal and Revlon were intended to
provide the basis of obtaining pre-closing injunctive relief in merger
transactions and were not intended to address post-closing claims for
money damages.119 We held that, “where the stockholders have had the
voluntary choice to accept or reject a transaction, the business judgment
standard of review is the presumptively correct one and best facilitates
wealth creation through the corporate form.”120 We emphasized that this
rule applies only to fully informed and uncoerced votes of disinterested
stockholders.121 If material facts were not disclosed, for example, the
Corwin rule would not apply. It applies outside the context of controlling
stockholder entire fairness transactions.
Corwin was followed by our decision in Singh v. Attenborough,122 in
which Corwin was applied. The Delaware Supreme Court observed that
“[w]hen the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked because
of a vote, dismissal is typically the result . . . because the vestigial waste
exception has long had little real-world relevance, [and] because it has
been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a
transaction that is wasteful.”123
Our certification procedure helps to achieve stability and consistency
in our law by allowing us to assist our sister courts, upon their request,
with questions of Delaware law pending before them.124
Since I have been on the bench we have issued a number of recent
opinions responding to requests for certification, many of them dealing
with Delaware’s approach to distinguishing direct and derivative claims
in corporate law. For instance, in NAF Holdings, LLC v. Li & Fung
(Trading) Limited,125 we answered a certified question from the United
116. Id.
117. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
118. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
119. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312.
120. Id. at 314.
121. Id. at 312.
122. 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016) (en banc).
123. Id. at 151–52 (citations omitted).
124. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
125. 118 A.3d 175 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.126 The Second Circuit
asked whether, under Delaware law, a plaintiff can bring a direct claim
for breach of contract against its contracting counterparty for failure to
render a benefit to a third-party “notwithstanding that (i) the third-party
beneficiary of the contract is a corporation in which the plaintiff-promisee
owns stock; and (ii) that the plaintiff-promisee’s loss derives indirectly
from the loss suffered by the third-party beneficiary corporation;” or if
such suit must be brought derivatively, on behalf of the third-party
beneficiary corporation.127
In response, the Supreme Court stated that, under Delaware law, “a
party to a commercial contract may sue to enforce its contractual rights
directly, without proceeding by way of a derivative action.”128 To answer
otherwise would be inconsistent with “fundamental principle[s] of
contract law” and Delaware’s policy to “promote reliable and efficient
corporate laws in order to facilitate commerce.”129
In so holding, the Court clarified that the familiar Tooley130 test
Delaware courts use to distinguish between direct and derivative actions
“do[es] not, and [was] never intended to, subject commercial contract
actions to a derivative suit requirement.”131 Instead, Tooley was intended
to facilitate “determining the line between direct actions for breach of
fiduciary duty suits by stockholders and derivative actions for breach of
fiduciary duty suits subject to the demand excusal rules.”132 The Court
reasoned that, before reaching that analysis “a more important initial
question has to be answered: does the plaintiff seek to bring a claim
belonging to her personally or one belonging to the corporation itself?”133
Following the NAF Holdings case, we received another certified
question from the Second Circuit concerning the distinction between
direct and derivative claims. This case, Citigroup Inc. v. AWH Investment
Partnership,134 offered an “opportunity to reaffirm our explanation in
126. Id. at 176.
127. Id. (quoting NAF Holdings, LLC v. Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd., 772 F.3d 740, 750
(2d Cir. 2014), certified question answered, 118 A.3d 175 (Del. 2015)).
128. Id. at 179.
129. Id. at 180–81 (citations omitted).
130. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).
131. NAF Holdings, 118 A.3d at 179 (citations omitted).
132. Id. (citing Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033) (additional citations omitted).
133. Id. at 180.
134. 140 A.3d 1125 (Del. 2016) (en banc).
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NAF Holdings of Tooley’s limited scope.”135 The Second Circuit asked
whether “the claims of a plaintiff against a corporate defendant alleging
damages based on the plaintiff’s continuing to hold the corporation’s
stock in reliance on the defendant’s misstatements as the stock diminished
in value [are] properly brought as direct or derivative claims[.]”136
Following the Second Circuit’s lead, we referred to these claims as
“holder” claims.137
The parties and the Second Circuit agreed that the plaintiff’s holder
claims would be governed by New York or Florida state law.138 We
determined that, under New York and Florida law, holder claims “belong
to the holder, not the issuer.”139 Accordingly, an analysis under Tooley
was unnecessary because, “as we explained in NAF Holdings, when a
plaintiff asserts a claim based on the plaintiff’s own right, such as a claim
for a breach of a commercial contract, Tooley does not apply.”140 The
Court observed that “Delaware law cannot convert a direct claim that
another state’s law has granted to securities holders by deciding that it
actually belongs to the corporation that the securities holder is suing.”141
Because under New York and Florida law the holder claims “could not
possibly belong to the corporation, Delaware law ha[d] nothing to do with
what type of claims the [plaintiffs] [we]re asserting.”142
In Culverhouse v. Paulson & Co.,143 the Delaware Supreme Court
was presented with another question of direct-versus-derivative standing.
The Eleventh Circuit certified a question concerning whether an investor
in a limited liability company (LLC) could maintain a direct action against
the general partner of a limited partnership (LP) where the LLC acted as
feeder fund to the LP.144 The Eleventh Circuit specified that the feeder
fund and the partnership “allocate losses to investors’ individual capital
accounts and do not issue transferrable shares and losses are shared by
135. Id. at 1139.
136. Id. at 1126 (quoting AHW Inv. P’ship v. Citigroup, Inc., 806 F.3d 695, 705 (2d
Cir. 2015), certified question answered, 140 A.3d 1125 (Del. 2016)).
137. See, e.g., id. at 1133.
138. Id. at 1137.
139. Id. at 1140.
140. Id. at 1139–40 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 1140.
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. 133 A.3d 195 (Del. 2016) (en banc).
144. Id. at 196.
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investors in proportion to their investments[.]”145 Importantly, the
investor in question was not a limited partner in the LP.146 Nevertheless,
he sought to assert breach of fiduciary duty and other claims against the
LP’s general partner following a transaction in which the LP lost $460
million.147
The Supreme Court found that the investor’s claims failed under both
prongs of Tooley. The Court noted that the investor had invested only in
the feeder fund, “which in turn invested in the” LP.148 Accordingly, the
alleged harm “would not in the first instance be suffered by” the
investor.149 Likewise, the investor “would in the first instance receive the
benefit of any recovery.”150 Accordingly, the investor’s claims were
derivative.151
Are there other catalysts for changes? There has been much change
in the composition of our Court during my short tenure. But the Court has
endeavored to conduct business as usual (and in my view it has). The
Court’s respect for its own precedents and principles of stare decisis
contribute to the Court’s stability during times when its composition
changes.
I was appointed to the bench at a very unique time in the Supreme
Court’s history. My appointment came during the midst of a number of
impending retirements on the court. I was sworn in on July 25, 2014 and
was the second woman to be appointed to the Delaware Supreme Court
in its history.152 Due to various retirements and new appointments on the
Court, I now occupy the second senior-most position on our Supreme
Court. At this point, the four current Justices were all appointed in or after
2014.153
One thing that has changed, at least to a limited degree, is the
increase in the number of separate opinions. In state and federal courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, it is not uncommon for three
or more separate opinions to be written in a single case, especially when
145. Id.
146. Id. at 199 n.15.
147. Id. at 197.
148. Id. at 198–99.
149. Id. at 199.
150. Id.
151. Id. Our court has also certified questions to other courts if their statutory scheme
permits. See e.g., In re Viking Pump, Inc., 148 A.3d 633, 642 (Del. 2016).
152. O’Sullivan, supra note 10.
153. Judicial Officers, supra note 14.
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important issues of public policy are involved. However, the Justices of
the Delaware Supreme Court historically rarely issued separate opinions,
even on controversial issues.154 In fact, until recently, over the past six
decades, nearly all of our Court’s decisions were unanimous.155 The
Justices’ tendency to issue unanimous opinions has been referred to as
Delaware’s “unanimity norm.”156
During the past couple of years, the Delaware Supreme Court
Justices have issued separate opinions (mostly dissents) more frequently.
During the years 2006 to 2014, the Court averaged approximately five
dissents per year. In 2015, Justices of the Court issued eleven dissents.157
154. Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy,
in DELAWARE SUPREME COURT GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 39, 40 (Randy J. Holland &
Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001) (citing David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in
Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 129 (1997)).
155. Robert H. Edmunds Jr., An Interview with Justice Randy Holland, JUDGES’ J.,
Summer 2014, at 4 (2014).
156. Id.
157. Siga Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 132 A.3d 1108, 1139–54 (Del. 2015)
(Valihura, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), as corrected (Dec. 28, 2015); E.
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Cach, LLC, 124 A.3d 585, 594–604 (Del. 2015) (Seitz, J., dissenting);
Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernic, 121 A.3d 1215, 1226–33 (Del. 2015) (Vaughn, J.,
dissenting); In re Favata, 119 A.3d 1283, 1293 (Del. 2015) (Vaughn, J., dissenting);
Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1209–13 (Del. 2015)
(Vaughn, J., dissenting); LG Elecs., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns, Inc., 114 A.3d 1246,
1259–70 (Del. 2015) (Valihura, J., dissenting); Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Arteaga,
113 A.3d 1045, 1060–67 (Del. 2015) (Vaughn, J., dissenting); Corvel Corp. v. Homeland
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 112 A.3d 863, 870–78 (Del. 2015) (Strine, C.J., dissenting), reargument
denied (Apr. 2, 2015); First Health Seulement Class v. Chartis Speciality Ins. Co., 111
A.3d 993, 1001–08 (Del. 2015) (Strine, C.J., dissenting); Sykes v. State, 147 A.3d 201,
220–26 (Del. 2015) (Strine, C.J., dissenting), reargument denied (Mar. 19, 2015);
Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 1060, 1066–75 (Del. 2015) (Strine, CJ., dissenting).
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In 2016, the Court had eight dissenting opinions.158 In 2017, there are
already a few.159
Separate opinions might indicate possible shifts in the law. Here is a
recent example. On December 20, 2016, the Delaware Supreme Court
issued an important decision in El Paso Pipeline GP Company, L.L.C. v.
Brinckerhoff.160 The El Paso case illustrates a number of important points
in the alternative entity context and, in particular, in dealing with conflict
transactions in the master limited partnership (MLP) context.
In El Paso, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the
Court of Chancery had erred as a matter of law in holding that the plaintiff
had standing to maintain his claims following the merger.161 The Court of
Chancery had characterized the plaintiffs’ claims as “dual” claims,
meaning they were both direct and derivative in nature.162 We reversed,
finding that the Court of Chancery had erred as the claim that the MLP
had overpaid in the transaction at issue was purely derivative.163 The harm
was to the Partnership, not to individual limited partners.164
The claim centered on the limited partnership agreement’s
contractual duty of good faith. The duty was owed, under the limited
partnership agreement (LPA), to the Partnership—not to the Limited
Partners.165 The claim was that the Partnership had overpaid in the
transaction was classically derivative.166
We said that the “trial court treated the governing instrument of the
Partnership as if it were a separate commercial contract, rather than it
158. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 134–39 (Del. 2016) (Valihura, J., dissenting);
Bon Ayre Land, LLC v. Bon Ayre Cmty. Ass’n, 149 A.3d 227, 238–40 (Del. 2016)
(Vaughn, J., dissenting); Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 487–501 (Del. 2016) (Valihura, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 501–07 (Vaughn, J., dissenting); Enrique
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 A.3d 506, 516–18 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J.,
dissenting); CDX Holdings, Inc. v. Fox, 141 A.3d 1037, 1042–58 (Del. 2016) (Valihura,
J., dissenting), reargument denied (June 13, 2016); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d
123, 148–49 (Del. 2016) (Vaughn, J., dissenting); McCaffrey v. Wilmington, 133 A.3d
536, 551–57 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See, e.g., Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 169–87 (Del. 2017) (Valihura, J.,
dissenting).
160. El Paso Pipeline GP Co. v. Brinckeroff (El Paso II), 152 A.3d 1248 (Del. 2016).
161. Id. at 1249–51.
162. Id. at 1251.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1261–62.
165. Id. at 1257–65.
166. Id. at 1251.
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being the constitutive contract of the Partnership.”167 “The reality that
limited partnership agreements often govern the territory that in corporate
law is covered by equitable principles of fiduciary duties does not make
all provisions of a limited partnership agreement enforceable by a direct
claim.”168
The result of the decision was that the damage award of $171 million
issued in the Chancery Court’s liability decision was reversed.169 In
reversing, we applied the continuous ownership requirement and held that
the merger had extinguished the plaintiff’s standing.170
The decision highlights the difficulty of developing and discerning
general principles in this complex area of the law involving MLP.
Notably, these MLP agreements (and in particular, the “Conflicts of
Interest” provisions) may contain common features, but are often
different in nuanced ways. Thus, writing for the Majority, I observed that
“the prevalence of entity-specific provisions in an area of law defined by
expansive contractual freedom requires a nuanced analysis and renders
deriving ‘general principles’ a cautious enterprise.”171
The El Paso decision also highlights that not every breach of a LPA
is “dual”—meaning both direct and derivative. The Gentile v. Rosette
case,172 as the Court of Chancery observed, had been somewhat
controversial and had been the source of some confusion in the Bar.173
The Delaware Supreme Court in Gentile had found certain “dual” claims
to be both direct and derivative where there was a transfer of both voting
power and economic value to a controlling stockholder.174 The El Paso
Majority “decline[d] the invitation to further expand the universe of
claims that can be asserted ‘dually’ to hold here that the extraction of
solely economic value from the minority by a controlling stockholder
constitutes direct injury.” 175
In following on the Majority’s reluctance to expand that universe of
“dual claims”, the short concurrence by Chief Justice Strine goes even
167. Id. at 1260.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1250–51.
170. Id. at 1252; see also Lewis v. Andersen, 477 A.2d 1040, 1049–50 (Del. 1984).
171. El Paso II, 152 A.3d at 1257.
172. 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006).
173. In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litig., 132 A.3d 67, 82 (Del. Ch.
2015).
174. Gentile, 906 A.2d at 99–100 (citations omitted).
175. El Paso II, 152 A.3d at 1264.
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further and suggests that Gentile v. Rossette “cannot be reconciled with
the strong weight of our precedent and it ought to be overruled.”176 Thus,
the El Paso Majority sent a signal that it did not wish to expand the
Gentile holding, and the Chief Justice indicated his desire to overrule it
altogether.
Our recent decision (March 20, 2017, as revised on March 28, 2017)
in Brinkerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc.177 illustrates the rare case
where the current Delaware Supreme Court reversed course on one of its
prior decisions (from 2013) in an effort to address a point in a prior
opinion that had caused some confusion. In Enbridge, the Court clarified
the pleading standard applicable to a general partner’s breach of a master
limited partnership agreement.178 There, the plaintiff argued that the
general partner had breached the limited partnership agreement (the
Enbridge LPA) by approving a significant internal business transaction
on terms he contended were not fair and reasonable.179 The Enbridge
plaintiff also argued that the general partner breached the Enbridge LPA
by amending it “to effect a ‘Special Tax Allocation’ whereby the public
investors would be allocated items of gross income that would otherwise
be allocated” to the general partner.180 The Court of Chancery dismissed
the complaint, finding that plaintiff had failed to plead bad faith as
required by the Enbridge LPA.181
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part, stating that:
The Court of Chancery cannot be faulted for faithfully applying our
earlier decision in Brinckerhoff III, and its rigorous pleading standard
176. Id. at 1266 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
177. 159 A.3d 242 (Del. 2017) (en banc).
178. Id. at 253–54. In recent years, the Delaware Supreme Court has decided a
number of cases in the Master Limited Partnership context. See, e.g., Dieckman v.
Regency GP LP, 155 A.3d 358 (Del. 2017); El Paso II, 152 A.3d at 1248; Emps. Ret.
Sys. of St. Louis v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc., 152 A.3d 1248 (Del. 2016) (unpublished table
opinion); Haynes Family Tr. v. Kinder Morgan G.P., Inc., 135 A.3d 76 (Del. 2016)
(unpublished table opinion); Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., No. 399, 2014, 2015 WL
803053 (Del. Feb. 26, 2015); Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, L.P., 72 A.3d 93 (Del.
2013); Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400 (Del. 2013), rev’d on other
grounds, Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013); Norton v. K-Sea
Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354 (Del. 2013); Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co.
(Brinckerhoff III), 67 A.3d 369 (Del. 2013).
179. Enbridge, 159 A.3d at 246.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 247.
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for bad faith. But we now change course from our earlier decision and
adhere to the more traditional definition of bad faith utilized in
Delaware entity law.182
In the earlier Brinckerhoff III decision, the Supreme Court held that
“to state a claim based on bad faith, the decision to enter into [a contested
transaction], under the circumstances, must be ‘so far beyond the bounds
of reasonable judgement that it seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith.’”183
In the recent March 20, 2017 Enbridge decision, however, the
Supreme Court “change[d] course” from Brinckerhoff III in favor of a
contractual “definition of bad faith that is commonly used in our entity
law and incorporated into the Enbridge LPA.”184 In doing so, our Court
reverted to a more traditional definition of bad faith than the one a prior
Court had employed in Brinckerhoff III (which more resembled principles
similar to pleading waste).185
Let me turn briefly to the last point, namely, what might contribute
to a lawyer’s effectiveness in practicing and appearing before our Court?
182. Id.
183. Brinckerhoff III, 67 A.3d at 373 (Del. 2013) (quoting Parnes v. Bally Entm’t
Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999)). The pleading standard for bad faith in
Brinckerhoff IIImirrored the pleading standard for corporate waste. See Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (“Roughly, a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets
for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any
reasonable person might be willing to trade.” (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d
327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997))).
184. Enbridge, 159 A.3d at 247. Citing our decision in Norton v. K-Sea Transp.
Partners, L.P., 67 A.3d 354 (Del. 2013), in which we construed a LPA provision
materially identical to the one in the Enbridge LPA, we held that a plaintiff alleging bad
faith under the Enbridge LPA must plead facts supporting an inference that the general
partner did not “reasonably believe that its action [was] in the best interest of, or not
inconsistent with, the best interests of the Partnership.” Enbridge, 159 A.3d at 253
(quoting Norton, 67 A.3d at 362). We then applied the contractual standard and held that
plaintiff “pled sufficient facts leading to an inference that the [contested] transaction was
not ‘fair and reasonable to the Partnership’ [as it was] ‘less favorable to the Partnership
than those generally being provided to or available from unrelated third parties.’” Id. at
257.
185. Brinckerhoff III, 67 A.3d at 373 (stating that Brinckerhoff had failed to allege
that “the decision to enter into the JVA, under the circumstances, [was] ‘so far beyond
the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground
other than bad faith’” (quoting Parnes, 722 A.2d at 1246)).
28 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
Knowledge of the case law impacting the issues in your case is
obviously paramount. As you can understand from my remarks thus far,
corporation law is far from static. New and different types of transactions
constantly are being devised and effectuated. The body of corporate and
alternative entity case law is continuously being developed in nuanced
ways with each new opinion. Keeping up with recent cases in real time is
a challenging endeavor for already busy practitioners. But it is an inherent
part of the fast-paced cadence of corporate practice, and it is absolutely
essential in order to be able to guide clients effectively in the transaction
and litigation context.
I submit to practitioners that even our Supreme Court opinions
relating to non-corporate matters may offer useful insight into such
matters such as interpreting contracts, statutes, legislative history, and
application of different standards of review.186
Our Court has tried to make it easier for the public to understand
what we do and how our Court functions. In March 2016, for example,
we revised our Court’s website to make it more user friendly.187 In
addition, our oral arguments are, for the most part and with limited
exceptions, live-streamed.188 Briefs in argued cases are available on our
website free of charge189 as well as our opinions.190 Some law and college
professors have told me that they have had their classes watch certain
arguments as part of their study of a certain corporate or criminal law
topics.
In addition to case law developments, it is also important to stay
abreast of developments in statutory changes to the DGCL. Recent
amendments to the DGCL have addressed such important topics as: forum
186. See, e.g., Terex Corp. v. S. Track & Pump, Inc., 117 A.3d 537, 543–47 (Del.
2015) (discussing principles of statutory construction), as revised (June 16, 2015).
187. Jessica Masulli Reyes, Check Out the New Delaware Courts Website, DEL.
ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2016, 11:59 AM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/
2016/03/16/check-out-new-delaware-courts-website/81818980/ [https://perma.cc/G2V
9-WCR7].
188. Delaware Supreme Court Oral Arguments, LIVESTREAM, https://livestream.com/
DelawareSupremeCourt [https://perma.cc/6E33-6RN6] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
189. Oral Arguments, DEL. CTS., https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/oralarguments/
[https://perma.cc/4LTV-E4AX] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
190. Opinions and Orders, DEL. CTS., https://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/index.asp
x?ag=supreme+court [https://perma.cc/94BS-HCEX] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
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selection bylaw provisions,191 fee-shifting bylaws,192 and important
amendments to the appraisal statute.193
Finally, time prevents me from going into an extended discussion of
appellate brief writing or oral argument best practices. But I leave with
just a few points that have some bearing on the points I have been
discussing tonight. First, arguments not fairly presented to the trial court
will generally not be considered on appeal, unless our “interest of justice”
exception applies.194 Thus, it is important to make and preserve your
arguments in the trial court. This rule assists in allowing the law to be
developed in a more orderly fashion by giving trial courts a fair
opportunity to consider issues first.
Second, a well-written brief with a candid treatment of the important
aspects of the record is very helpful to the Court. It is also very important
to address relevant and controlling cases in a candid manner.
Third, you can safely assume that the Court is thoroughly familiar
with the record in the case. Oral argument is really most useful to the
Court as a means to have counsel respond to particular questions the
Justices have. Being able to respond to those questions effectively is
important. Rather than planning to give a prepared oral presentation, a
moot court session might be a more effective way to prepare for an
appearance before our Court.
Finally, the Court appreciates counsel who are able to answer
hypothetical questions. The Justices are well aware that the facts
presented in a hypothetical question are “not your case.” However, the
Justices are likely thinking more broadly about the law and the potential
policy implications presented by issues in your case.
In closing, I would be remiss if I did not say how privileged and
humbled I am to be able to serve as a Justice on the Delaware Supreme
Court. I am grateful for the opportunity to serve my State, and finally, I
am especially appreciative of your kind attention this evening.
With these comments, I conclude my prepared remarks and, if time
permits, will answer a few questions. Thank you very much.
191. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2017).
192. Id. §§ 102(f), 109(b).
193. Id. § 262(g)–(h).
194. Delaware Supreme Court Rule 8 provides: “Only questions fairly presented to
the trial court may be presented for review; provided, however, that when the interests of
justice so require, the Court may consider and determine any question not so presented.”
DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8.
